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Abstract
This article is a rst look at the prot and welfare e¤ects of behavior-based price discri-
mination in a two-period multi-dimensional preferences model. Compared to one-dimensional
models, we show that rms compete less aggressively in both periods and so new results are
obtained. Specically, under forward looking consumers and two symmetric dimensions, BBPD
boosts industry prots at the expense of consumers. However, we show that the standard one-
dimensional welfare results can prevail under asymmetric dimensions and myopic consumers.
Keywords: Multi-dimension; competitive price discrimination; customer recognition.
JEL Classication Codes: D43, L13, L40
1 Introduction
In many markets with repeat purchases rms usually face customers with multi-dimensional
preferences (e.g. for product taste, brands, stores location, and so on). When price discrimination
is permitted and trade among consumers is not feasible, it is common for a rm to o¤er di¤erent
prices to its repeat customers and to those who bought from a rival before. This form of price
discrimination, termed Behavior-Based Price Discrimination (henceforth BBPD), sometimes also
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called price discrimination based on purchase history or dynamic pricing, is widely observed in
many markets. In the communications markets, for instance, rms frequently o¤er a lower price to
a customer who has been using a competitors service. Similar pricing strategies are employed in
markets such as supermarkets, web retailers, credit cards, banking services and electricity and gas.1
Although this type of competitive price discrimination has received wide attention in the economics
literature in recent years,2 the literature has hitherto focused on the assumption that consumer
preferences are one-dimensional. Interestingly, in some markets where rms often discriminate
between their own and the rivalsconsumers, consumer preferences might be better represented by
a multi-dimensional framework.
To motivate our model suppose that consumer preferences for two companies, say McDonalds
(Mc) and Burger King (BK) are modeled taking into account two dimensions: the brand preference
dimension and the stores physical location dimension. This suggests that a specic consumer might
have a strong preference for Mc in the brand dimension while he might have a strong preference
for BK in the physical location dimension. Considering our motivating example, suppose that Mc
and BK are running a mobile price advertising campaign. Both are able to distinguish a repeated
customer from a new one and they have access to tools that allow them to send mobile ads with
di¤erent o¤ers (prices) to old and new customers. Companies have, however, no information about
individualstrue brand preference/location. A potential customer who is recognized as a repeated
customer by BK can receive a targeted o¤er by BK. That same consumer may also be tracked by
Mc which will recognize him/her as a new one and send a special o¤er. If the last o¤er is compelling
enough, Mc can entice the consumer to travel to its store. While in the standard one-dimensional
analysis a consumer who bough from BK in period 1 is necessarily closer to BK in that dimension,
in a two-dimensional setting a consumer who bough from BK in period 1 might be closer to BK
in one dimension but closer to Mc in the other one. Therefore, in this new setting some important
issues are the following. What changes in terms of the companiespricing strategies when we move
from a one to a multi-dimensional framework? Do rms compete more or less aggressively in prices?
In what circumstances is BBPD a protable strategy for companies? Do consumers benet from
BBPD?
Our base model follows Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) by considering a two-period duopoly with
a multi-dimensional horizontal product di¤erentiation, where rms cannot commit to future prices,
and can quote a di¤erent price to old/new customers. This paper o¤ers important insights to the
1A recent report by the O¢ ce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem (2008)), the regulator for Britains gas and
electricity industries, has revealed that, in this industry: (i) a substantial fraction of consumers are switchers in
the sense that they constantly seek out for the best deal in the market; and (ii) suppliers are well aware of these
consumersdynamics and do take them into account in their pricing decisions. In particular, companies charge more
to existing (sticky) customers whilst maintaining competitiveness in more price sensitive segments of the market.
Available for download at: http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/ensuppro/Pages/Energysupplyprobe.aspx
2Chen (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) and Esteves (2009) present updated literature surveys on BBPD.
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understanding of the rmspricing decisions to their strong and weak market segments in markets
with multi-dimensional preferences. An important contribution is to show that competitive price
discrimination based on purchase history needs not necessarily lead to the prisonersdilemma result
that generally follows in one-dimensional markets that exhibit best-response asymmetry. In fact,
our analysis reveals that the practice of BBPD in a symmetric two-dimensional model hurts second
period prot but boosts rst period prot as well as overall prots. Further, in contrast to the
general presumption in one-dimensional models that BBPD is not bad for consumers, we show that
in a symmetric two-dimensional setting do in fact BBPD raise industry prots at the expense of
consumers. Further, another important contribution is to clearly describe what market features
are needed for BBPD to boost industry prots at the expense of consumers. The extension of the
model to 2 asymmetric dimensions reveals that su¢ cient symmetry is a key determinant for our
results.
Literature review This paper is mainly related to two strands of the literature, namely the
literature on competition in multi-dimensional product di¤erentiation markets and the literature
on competitive price discrimination, mainly the literature on behavior-based price discrimination.
In a seminal paper, Irmen and Thisse (1998) analyze duopoly location choice in a general
n-dimensional model. With the assumption of strong dominance, they show that rms want to
maximize di¤erentiation on the dominant dimension but minimize di¤erentiation on all other di-
mensions. Liu and Shuai (2013) employs a similar model of 2-group price discrimination. Their
model is one-period, and rms price discriminate based on exogenous information about consumers.
In contrast, we consider a two-period model here where consumer information is generated endoge-
nously through rst-period consumer choices. Nevertheless, our results are similar in spirit in the
sense that price discrimination (whether based on exogenous or endogenous information) can ben-
et rms at the cost of consumers, once we allow product di¤erentiation to occur on more than
one dimension.
This paper has also important connections with the literature on BBPD in one-dimensional
competitive markets. Two approaches have been considered so far. In the switching costs approach,
consumers initially view the two rms as perfect substitutes; but in the second period they face
a switching cost if they change supplier. In this setting, purchase history discloses information
about exogenous switching costs (e.g. Chen, 1997 and Taylor, 2003). Di¤erently, in the brand
preferences approach with xed preferences across periods (e.g. Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010), purchase history discloses information about a consumers exogenous
brand preference for a rm. Although the framework of competition di¤ers in both approaches
their predictions have some common features. In these models the market exhibits best-response
asymmetry (Corts, 1998): the strong market segment of one rm is the weak market segment of the
competitor. A common nding in such models is that rms charge lower prices to customers in weak
market segments (new/rivals customers) than to customers in strong segments (old customers)
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and, in comparison to uniform pricing, equilibrium prots fall with price discrimination rms
nd themselves in the classic prisoners dilemma.3 Nonetheless, important di¤erences arise in both
approaches when taking into account the e¤ects of poaching on initial prices. While in the brand
preference approach initial prices are high and then decrease (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000), in
the switching costs approach the reverse happens (e.g. Chen, 1997).
This article contributes to the literature on price discrimination based on purchase history by
investigating the prot and welfare e¤ects of BBPD in a two-dimensional consumer preferences
model. By doing so, we show that BBPD can boost industry prots at the expense of consumers.
Chen and Pearcy (2010) have also shown that prots can increase with BBPD in a one dimensional
consumer preferences model. However, this is only the case when consumer preferences are weakly
correlated across time. Although our framework is di¤erent from Chen and Pearcy (2010) (prefer-
ences are two-dimensional and xed across periods), both papers seem to highlight that the practice
of BBPD in the context of a certain level of uncertainty about consumer preferences softens price
competition and allows rms to use BBPD as a protable pricing strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Section 3
analyzes the 2-dimensional base model with symmetric dimensions. Then Section 4 discusses the
welfare e¤ects of BBPD and Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results to few extensions. We
conclude in Section 6. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Two rms A and B produce at zero marginal cost nondurable goods A and B.4 There are two
periods, 1 and 2. The total number of consumers in the market is normalized to one. In each
period, each consumer wishes to buy a single unit of the good from either rm A or B, and he/she
is willing to pay at most V: The reservation value V is su¢ ciently large so all consumers buy in the
equilibrium (covered market). Consumers have exogenous preferences for goods that are present
from the start and remain xed over the two periods of consumption.5 Specically, consumer
preferences are specied in a 2-dimensional Hotelling model or on the unit square [0; 1]2; with rm
A located at (0; 0) and rm B located at (1; 1). Consumers are uniformly distributed on the two
dimensions and distribution on the two dimensions is independent from each other. The location
of a consumer on the square, i.e. (x; y) 2 [0; 1]2, represents his/her two-dimensional preference for
3More recently, also in a one-dimensional approach, Chen and Pearcy (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010) have
shown that prots can increase with price discrimination, basically when consumer preferences are weakly correlated
across time as well as in the case of high enough consumer heterogeneity.
4The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results derived
throughout the model.
5For a one-dimensional model of BBPD with imperfect correlated preferences across periods see Chen and Pearcy
(2010).
4
goods (e.g. preferences for brand name/good; characteristic 1/characteristic 2 of the good; store
location/good). Further, consumers incur a disutility from travelling to the location of each rm
(good), which is quadratic in the distance traveled.6 For a consumer located at (x; y) buying one
unit of the good from A at price pA, the indirect utility is written as
uA = V   pA   tx2   ty2;
where t is the unit transport cost on either dimension.7 Similarly, if the consumer buys from rm
B at price pB his/her indirect utility is written as
uB = V   pB   t(1  x)2   t(1  y)2:
Thus, our assumptions are quite standard in the literature except that we consider a two-
dimensional rather than the common one-dimensional model.
Suppose rms cannot commit to future prices. Consumers reveal information about their pref-
erences by their rst-period choice. Thus, in period 1 each rm sets a uniform price because it has
no information to price discriminate. Observing the prices, consumers make rst-period purchasing
decisions. Depending on the purchasing decisions in period 1, the whole market is divided into two
markets: rm As turf (Market 1) and rm Bs turf (Market 2). Hence, in period 2, each rm
can distinguish consumers in the two markets and price discriminate accordingly: each rm will
choose a price to its own past customers and another one to those consumers who purchased from
the rival before. In each period, rms choose their prices simultaneously. A strategy for rm i;
i = A;B, species p1i in period 1 and prices (p2i1; p2i2) in period 2 based on consumersprevious
purchases, where p2i1 and p2i2 are, respectively, rm is prices for consumers in market 1 (those
who bought from rm A in period 1) and for consumers in market 2 (those who bought from rm B
in period 1). We look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Before proceeding, we rst explain
how consumers would make their purchasing decisions for any given prices.
The Marginal Consumers Line (MCL)
In particular, we derive the set of consumers who are indi¤erent between buying from either
rm. We show that they form a line and we call it the Marginal Consumers Line (MCL). Then
consumers to the left (or bottom) of the MCL will purchase from rm A while consumers to the
right (or above) of the MCL will purchase from rm B.
Look rst at second-period price competition. Let p2ij , i = A;B with j = 1; 2 denote second
period prices o¤ered by rms A and B to consumers in market j. A consumer is indi¤erent between
the two rms if and only if u2A(x; y) = u2B(x; y), from which we obtain
V   p2Aj   tx2   ty2 = V   p2Bj   t(1  x)2   t(1  y)2
6 In our setup, linear and quadratic transport cost lead to the same equilibrium prices and prots.
7We consider the case of asymmetric dimensions (t1 6= t2) in the Extensions.
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which yields
x = 1  y + p2Bj   p2Aj
2
:
Look next at rst-period competition. Let rm As rst-period price be p1A and rm Bs
rst-period price be p1B. The marginal consumer in the rst period will surely switch in the
second period to take advantage of the poaching price. Given the rst-period prices, the indi¤erent
consumer between buying from rm A in period 1 at price pA1 and then buying from B in period
2 at the poaching price p2B1, or buying from B in period 1 at price p1B and then buying from
A at the poaching price p2A2 is located at the marginal consumers line MCL, characterized by
u1A + u2B = u1B + u2A; or, equivalently
p1A+tx
2+ty2+

p2B1 + t(1  x)2 + t(1  y)2

= p1B+t (1  x)2+t (1  y)2+

p2A2 + tx
2 + ty2

:
which yields
x = 1  y + p1B   p1A +  (p2A2   p2B1)
2t (1  ) :
2.1 Uniform pricing in a two-dimensional model
The case where rms cannot price discriminate, meaning that each rm sets a uniform price to
all consumers in each period, is used as a benchmark in the subsequent analysis. Suppose that for
some reason (e.g. regulation, costs of changing prices, technological restrictions) rms in the second
period can not price discriminate. In that case, the two-period model reduces to two replications
of the static equilibrium which has been analyzed in several existing studies (e.g. Liu and Shuai,
2013; Tabuchi, 1994). Based on these models it is straightforward to prove that rm is equilibrium
prices and prots (marked with superscript u; for uniform pricing) in each period are:
pu1i = p
u
2i = t; (1)
u1i = 
u
2i =
t
2
; (2)
and rm is overall prot is equal to
ui =
t
2
(1 + ) : (3)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
As usual in order to nd the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium we solve the game working
backwards from the second period.
6
3.1 Second-period
In period 2, each rm is able to distinguish its own customers from those who bought from the
rival before, and charge di¤erent prices accordingly. Without loss of generality, assume that given
the rmsrst-period prices, the rst-period MCL crosses the bottom horizontal line at (x1; 0) with
x1 2 (0; 1].8 The MCL thus splits the square into two markets: market 1 consists of those customers
who bought from rm A in period 1, while market 2 is made o¤ consumers who bought from rm B
in period 1. In the second period rms compete in these two markets separately. We rst establish
the equilibrium demand structure in period 2, given the prices tailored to each market.
Lemma 1 In period 2, MCL must cross the bottom horizontal line in market 1 and cross the top
horizontal line in market 2.
Proof. Let us start with market 1 which is itself a triangle. MCL cannot possibly cross top
horizontal line in period 2.
What about market 2? Suppose that MCL crosses bottom horizontal line at (x3; 0), with
x3 2 (x1; 1]. Under this demand structure, we solve the equilibrium prices. We nd that they lead
to x3 > 1, suggesting that MCL crosses the top horizontal line, violation.
Based on Lemma 1, we draw the demand structure as in Figure 1. Suppose that MCL21 crosses
the bottom horizontal line in market 1 at (x2; 0), and the MCL22 crosses the top horizontal line at
(x3; 1) in market 2 (rm Bs old customers).
Let q2ij (determined in the Appendix) represent rm i = A;Bs second-period demand in market
j = 1; 2; then rm is second-period prot in market j equals:
2ij = p2ij  q2ij (4)
In the second period, each rm chooses the second-period prices in order to maximize expression
(4). Overall second-period prot for rm i is 2i = 2i1 + 2i2:
8Due to rm symmetry, if MCL crosses the top horizontal line, then one can switch rm A and Bs location and
labeling.
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Market 1
Market 2
1MCL
21MCL
22MCL
)0,( 2x )0,( 1x
)1,( 3x
Figure 1: Demand structures (MCLs) in period 1 and 2.
The next Lemma characterizes the second-period price equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the MCL crosses the bottom horizontal line at (x1; 0) in period 1. Then
second period equilibrium prices are:
(i) if x1  23 :
p2A1 = 2t (1  x1) ; p2B1 = 0;
p2A2 =
t
4

3
q
9  4x21   5

; p2B2 =
t
4
q
9  4x21 + 1

;
(ii) if 23  x1  1 :
p2A1 =
t
4
q
4x21 + 1 + 1

; p2B1 =
t
4

3
q
4x21 + 1  5

;
p2A2 =
t
4

3
q
9  4x21   5

; p2B2 =
t
4
q
9  4x21 + 1

:
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Proof. See the Appendix.
When 23  x1  1; rm A and Bs second-period prots are respectively equal to:
2A =
t
32

 40 +
q
1 + 4x21 + 24x
2
1 +
q
1 + 4x21x
2
1 + 19
q
9  4x21   9x21
q
9  4x21

;
and
2B =
t
32

 24x21 + 9
q
1 + 4x21x
2
1 + 8 +
q
1 + 4x21 + 3
q
9  4x21   x21
q
9  4x21

:
When x1  23 ; then:
2A =
t
32

53x21   32x31   41 + 19
q
9  4x21   9x21
q
9  4x21

;
and
2B =
t
118

1 +
q
9  4x21
3
:
Figures 2 and 3 plot both rmsprices targeted to market 1 and 2 as a function of x1, for the
case where t = 1:
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Figure 2: Firm A and Bs second-period prices for market 1
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Figure 3: Firm A and Bs second-period prices for market 2
Corollary 1. Regarding the prices targeted to market 1 and 2, moving from uniform pricing
to BBPD:
(i) increases the price for rm As old consumers, i.e., p2A1 > pu as long as x1 < 12 ; otherwise
the reverse happens, thus p2A1  pu:
(ii) decreases the price for rm Bs new consumers, regardless of x1.
(iii) decreases both rmsprices targeted to market 2, regardless the value of x1:
Look rst at prices targeted to market 2. The previous corollary suggests that compared to
uniform pricing, as long as x1 is not null, both rms charge a lower price to customers in market 2.
Specically, we observe that p2A2 < p2B2 < pu: As x1 increases the same happens to the di¤erence
between p2B2 and p2A2: This suggests that rm A is more likely to poach some of rm Bs previous
customers the higher is x1.
Look next at prices targeted to market 1. Corollary 1 suggests that the price o¤ered by rm
B to new customers is always below the uniform price, while the price o¤ered by rm A to its old
customers can be above/below its uniform counterpart. Note that the lower is x1 the higher is
rm Bs market share in period 1 (and so the size of market 2). Indeed, when x1 is small enough,
attracting new consumers is not protable for rm B as it would require a below-marginal-cost
price. This case is presented in point (i) of Lemma 2 where rm B prefers the dominant strategy
of setting a poached price equal to the marginal cost (i.e., p2B1 = 0) in rm As turf (market 1).
From the point of view of rm A, the lower is x1 the weaker the price competition in its own turf,
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as the rival becomes less aggressive. For this reason, when x1 < 23 ; the equilibrium price o¤ered by
rm A to its old customers is decreasing in x1, and can be above the uniform price. This nding
is in contrast to what happens in the one-dimensional model, where the second period prices are
all below the uniform price when BBPD is permitted. Taking into account the equilibrium prices
targeted to market 1, we also nd that if x1 is not su¢ ciently high then rm B (the dominating rm
in period 1) does not attract any consumer in market 1, even though it charges a price equal to the
marginal cost. In contrast, when x1 is su¢ ciently high (the rst-period market share is balanced
enough), and in this case rm B is able to attract some consumers in market 1. Consequently, both
rmsprices targeted to market 1 are below the uniform price. Finally, it is important to stress
that in the case where x1 = 1; then both rms share equally the market in period 1. In this case, as
usual in the literature, we observe that p2B1 < p2A1 < pu; and rm B is able to poach some of rm
As previous customers. Furthermore, when x1 = 1; we have that p2A1 = p2B2 and p2A2 = p2B1:
3.2 First-period
We now move on to period 1. We rst show that there is no asymmetric subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (i.e., with p1A 6= p1B).
Lemma 3 There is no asymmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium (with p1A 6= p1B).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Having ruled out asymmetric equilibrium, we look for the symmetric SPNE and we nd a unique
one, characterized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 1 When rms can engage in BBPD in a two-dimensional market, in the unique
subgame perfect nash equilibrium:
(i) rst-period prices are
p1A = p1B = t
 
1 +
13
p
5  25
10

!
; (5)
(ii) second-period 2 prices are
p2A1 = p2B2 = t
 
1 +
p
5
4
!
(6)
p2A2 = p2B1 = t
 
3
p
5  5
4
!
; (7)
(iii) second-period prots are
2A = 2B = t
 
3
p
5  4
8
!
; and
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(iv) each rms overall discounted prot is
BBPD = t
 
1
2
+
41
p
5  70
40

!
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Competitive and welfare e¤ects
This section looks at the price, prot, consumer surplus and welfare e¤ects of BBPD in a two-
dimensional consumer preferences market. In order to provide this analysis, prices, prots and
consumer surplus resulting under BBPD in the two-dimensional model are compared with (i) the
benchmark case of no BBPD, which serves to isolate the impact of price discrimination; and with
(ii) BBPD in the one-dimensional model.
4.1 E¤ect on prices
Most of the existing academic literature on BBPD suggests that when the market exhibits
best-response asymmetry one rms weak market is the others strong market the optimal choice
for each rm is to o¤er a lower price to its low preference consumers than to its high preference
consumers (e.g. Chen, 1997; Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010).9 In
what follows we investigate this issue and also how BBPD a¤ects the rmsrst-period decisions.
Compared to the uniform benchmark case, the equilibrium price with BBPD is higher for all
consumers in period 1 but lower for all consumers in period 2, the same as in the one dimensional
model (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). As purchase history reveals the consumersbrand preferences,
each rm has an incentive to reduce the price to customers who bought from the rival before as an
attempt to entice them to switch. However, because both rms set a lower price to customers in
their weak markets, they induce the rival to be more aggressive in its strong market as well. Due
to the intensied competition e¤ect of price discrimination, all prices fall in period 2. Thus our
analysis conrms the usual ndings in the literature, suggesting that in the two-dimensional model
rms also quote lower prices to their weak segment than to their strong segment of consumers.
However, it is important to stress that although second-period equilibrium prices fall with price
discrimination in our set-up, the same as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), second-period prices in the
two-dimensional model are above their one dimensional counterparts. According to Proposition 1,
repeated consumers pay t

1+
p
5
4

which is above the price they pay in the one-dimensional approach
9An exception is Shin and Sudhir (2010) who show that rms can charge a low price to their strong customers
when consumer preferences stochasticity across time and consumer heterogeneity are simultaneously high enough.
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(i.e.,2t3 ). Similarly, in the two-dimensional model, the price for new customers is t

3
p
5 5
4

which is
also above its counterpart of 13 t in the one-dimensional set-up. This suggests that the existence of a
second-dimension acts to soften price competition in period 2, allowing rms to raise second-period
prices, compared to the one-dimensional model. The driving force behind this result is the following.
In a one dimensional model all consumers in say rm Bs weak market have a preference for rm A,
suggesting that rm B wants to price aggressively in this market. In contrast, in a two-dimensional
model, not all consumers in a rms weak market have a preference for the rivals product in the
two dimensions. Indeed, in a two-dimensional model, some consumers in, for instance, rm Bs
weak market might have a preference for rm A in one dimension while they might prefer rm B in
the other dimension. This suggests that compared to the one-dimensional model, rm B has now
fewer incentives to reduce the price to consumers who bought from rm A in period 1. Because
prices are strategic complements, when rm B prices less aggressively in its weak market, rm A
reacts in the same way regarding the price tailored to its strong segment of the market. As a result
of that, old and new customers face higher prices in the two-dimensional model.
As to the e¤ect of BBPD on the rst-period price, we nd that it is equal to t

1 + 13
p
5 25
10 

in
the two-dimensional model, while it is equal to t(1+ =3) in the one-dimensional set-up. Therefore,
it is straightforward to see that as long as  > 0; each rm charges a higher rst-period equilibrium
price when consumer preferences are two-dimensional. This highlights that BBPD has a stronger
positive e¤ect on the rst-period price in our set-up than in the one-dimensional counterpart.
Before proceeding we discuss with more detail the main di¤erences and intuitions behind the
impact of BBPD on rst-period prices in the one and two dimensional models. Consider rst the
one-dimensional model (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). Here, the reason why the rst period price is
above the uniform one is entirely explained by the decreased elasticity of demand. The intuition is
the following. When consumers are sophisticated they anticipate the lower second period price and
thus they become less price sensitive in period 1. This softens price competition in period 1, allowing
rms to raise the rst period equilibrium price. In contrast, when consumers are myopic, BBPD
has no e¤ect on the rst period price equilibrium. Thus, in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), compared
to uniform pricing, rms do not distort their rst-period price equilibrium when consumers are
naive.
Consider next our two-dimensional framework. Here the decreased elasticity of demand can also
explain in part why the rst-period price is above its non-discrimination counterpart. This is spe-
cially the case when consumers are forward-looking. The reason is that, in contrast to what happens
in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), here we still nd that rms price above the non-discrimination
price in period 1 even when consumers are assumed to be naive (see the discussion in Section
5.2). Therefore, our analysis suggests that in the two-dimensional model apart from the decreased
elasticity of demand there should be another driving force behind the higher rst-period prices.
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In general it can be said that when rms can engage in price discrimination based on purchase
history there are two e¤ects on rst-period prices: a consumer-side e¤ect and a rm-side e¤ect.
When consumers are forward-looking they correctly anticipate lower second period prices, become
less price sensitive in period 1 and so there is a positive e¤ect on rst-period prices. When rms are
forward looking, they also take into account that changes in the rst-period price change the rst-
period cuto¤ and thus change the nature of the second-period competition. In the one dimensional
model of BBPD a change in the rst-period price has no e¤ect on second-period prot because
with a uniform distribution a rms marginal gains in one second-period market are exactly o¤set
by losses in the other (@2@p1 = 0): Thus, in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) the decrease in the price
sensitivity of consumers in period 1 that occurs when we move from no discrimination to BBPD
fully determines the result of rst-period prices above the non-discrimination level.
In the two-dimensional model we nd that, with the uniform distribution, a change in the rst-
period price does not cancel out in the neighborhood of x1 = 1, specically we nd that
@2A
@p1A
> 0,
suggesting that rm As marginal gains in one second-period market (higher price p2A2 targeted to
market 2) are higher than losses in the other (lower price p2A1 targeted market 1). Put di¤erently,
the reason why BBPD raises rst period prices in the two dimensional model is because the MCL
in the second period crosses one horizontal line and one vertical line. In this case the length of
the MCL depends on prices. If say rm A is aggressive in the rst period, its strong market is
larger in the second period, in equilibrium, the length of the MCL is likely to be larger, and more
marginal consumers means that rm B would have more incentive to charge a lower price. Thus
aggressive pricing in the rst period will induce its competitor not only be aggressive in the rst
period, but also in the second period. In contrast when rm A charges a higher rst period price,
its strong market is smaller in the second period, in equilibrium, the length of the MCL is likely
to be smaller, and less marginal consumers means that rm B would have less incentive to charge
a lower price. Thus an increase in the rst period price will induce its competitor not only to
play less aggressively in the rst period, but also in the second period. Consequently, each rms
rst period price with BBPD is thus higher than its uniform counterpart. This is also true when
consumers are myopic ( = 0), suggesting that in our framework BBPD leads to higher rst-period
prices even when consumers are myopic.
Summing up, compared to the one-dimensional framework our analysis highlights that price
discrimination leads rms to compete less aggressively in both periods, suggesting that di¤erent
prot e¤ects can arise in the bi-dimensional consumer preferences set-up.
4.2 E¤ect on prots
An important question for academics, managers and practitioners is whether price discrimina-
tion by purchase history is a protable strategy for rms in comparison to uniform pricing. In most
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the economic environments that have been used in the literature, oligopoly price discrimination
based on customers past behavior tends to lower industry prots. This is generally the case in
oligopoly markets characterized by best-response asymmetry and one-dimensional consumer pref-
erences which are stable across time (e.g. Chen, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010;
to name few). Our aim in this section is to investigate whether this common nding in the literature
remains when we allow consumer preferences to be bi-dimensional and stable across time.
Compared to the non-discrimination benchmark, we nd that price discrimination raises the
equilibrium prot in period 1 whereas it reduces the equilibrium prot in period 2. The next
corollary summarizes the prot e¤ects of BBPD in our model.
Corollary 2. In a two-dimensional consumer preferences model, Behavior-Based Price Dis-
crimination hurts second period prot but boosts rst period prot and overall prots.
An important contribution of this paper is to show that price discrimination by purchase history
is a protable strategy for rms when consumer preferences are two-dimensional. Indeed, Corollary
2 highlights that the positive e¤ect of price discrimination on rst-period prot dominates the neg-
ative e¤ect on second-period prot, thus the ability of rms to engage in price discrimination based
on purchase history actually raises the overall discounted equilibrium prot in a two-dimensional
model. Note that BBPD > U ; so BBPD actually raises overall prots relative to the uniform
pricing. Consequently, this nding is in sharp contrast to the overall prot e¤ect of BBPD in
one-dimensional models, in which rms nd themselves in the classic prisoners dilemma when
they employ BBPD. Obviously, the economic intuition behind our result is based on the previous
explanation about the e¤ect of BBPD on rst and second period prices.
Compared to BBPD in one-dimensional models, we can show that the positive impact of BBPD
on rst period prot is stronger in a two-dimensional than in a one-dimensional model, thus:
2 dimension1i > 
1 dimension
1i >

U =
t
2

; i = A;B:
Additionally, straightforward computations show also that moving from a one-dimensional analysis
to a two-dimensional one, reduces the negative impact of BBPD on second period prots. This
yields 
U =
t
2

> 2 dimension2i > 
1 dimension
2i ; i = A;B:
Summing up, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the prot implications of this form
of dynamic price discrimination, only made possible in the context of digital markets. Like Chen
and Pearcy (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010) we nd that BBPD can actually raise equilibrium
prots. However, in their one-dimensional consumer preferences models this is only the case when
the consumerspreference dependence across time is low. In fact, when preferences are xed across
time, industry prots fall under BBPD.
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4.3 E¤ect on consumer surplus and overall welfare
In this section we discuss the main policy implications for competition policy agencies and/or
consumer advocates that can be derived from our theoretical model. Policy options against price
discrimination by purchase history should be based on the whether price discrimination is likely
to be benecial to consumers or not. A general presumption in the literature on BBPD in one-
dimensional models with xed preferences across time is that price discrimination by purchase
history ... is by and large unlikely to raise signicant antitrust concerns. In fact, as the economics
literature suggests, such pricing practices in oligopoly markets often intensify competition and
potentially benet consumers. (Chen, 2005, p. 123). Our goal in this section is to investigate
what changes in terms of the consumer welfare e¤ects when BBPD is employed in the context of a
bi-dimensional model.
Interestingly, Corollary 3 shows that price discrimination based on consumerspast behavior will
increase industry prots at the expense of consumerssurplus and overall welfare. It is important
to stress that consumers in the middle, close to the main diagonal will be better o¤ under BBPD.
Those far away will be worse o¤. However, in aggregate terms they enjoy a lower surplus with
BBPD than under uniform pricing. Therefore, our analysis highlights that the welfare e¤ects of
BBPD in a one dimensional setting higher consumer surplus at the expense of industry prots
and welfare do not prevail when we allow preferences to be two-dimensional.
Corollary 3. In a two-dimensional model, compared to uniform pricing, Behavior-Based Price
Discrimination harms consumer surplus and overall welfare.
The proof of Corollary 3 is straightforward. Regarding overall welfare note that total transport
cost is minimized under uniform pricing. Therefore, social surplus must be lower under BBPD.
Combined with higher prots under BBPD, it follows that in aggregate consumer surplus must be
lower under BBPD than under uniform pricing.
In order to summarize the main literature ndings and inform competition policy agencies, Table
1 shows the comparative static results obtained in a model of one-dimensional xed preferences
across time (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000); in a model of one-dimensional correlated preferences
across time (Chen and Pearcy, 2010) and in a model of two-dimensional xed preferences across
time.
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Table 1: Comparative static results
Models Overall Prots CS W
OD model with xed preferences
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
Below U Above U Below U
OD model with correlated preferences
Chen and Pearcy (2010)
Below U (HD)/
Above U (LD)
Below U (LD)/
Above U (HD)
Below U
TD model with xed preferences
Present paper
Above U Below U Below U
(OD: one dimensional, TD: two-dimensional; LD: low dependence; HD: high dependence; U: uniform
pricing)
Regarding the aggregate e¤ects of BBPD on welfare, because there is no role for price discrimi-
nation to increase aggregate output, variations in welfare are uniquely explained by the disutility
supported by those consumers who buy ine¢ ciently.10 As a result of that, in comparison to no
discrimination, BBPD hurts overall welfare in the three models considered. Table 1 also shows
that in fact the prot and consumer welfare e¤ects obtained in a one-dimensional model with xed
preferences are the reverse of their counterparts in the two-dimensional model of consumer prefer-
ences. Di¤erent conclusions are obtained when we compare our results with those obtained by Chen
and Pearcy (2010). As expected they conrm the welfare e¤ects in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
when consumer preferencesdependence across the two periods is high. In contrast, when consumer
preferencesdependence is low (or independent), like in our setting, they nd that BBPD boosts
industry prots at the expense of consumer welfare. In spite of the di¤erent assumptions considered
in their model and in ours, the intuition behind the same prot and consumer welfare e¤ect is based
on what rms learn about consumer preferences. The existence of some level of uncertainty about
consumer preferences either due to the two-dimensional assumption or to unstable preferences
across time acts to soften price competition between rms which in turn enhances industry prots
at the expense of consumers.
Summing up, taking into account our ndings and those in the economics literature, we can
say that conclusions regarding the prot and welfare e¤ects of price discrimination based purchase
history do depend on the way consumer preferences are modelled and on what is learned about
consumers. Our results, thus, carry an important policy implications regarding the practice of price
discrimination by purchase history. When the welfare standard adopted by competition authorities
to appraise price discrimination based on purchase history is the consumerswelfare,11 our model
10For a model where BBPD can a¤ect aggregate output see Esteves and Reggiani (2014).
11 It should be noted, however, that the adoption of the consumerswelfare standard appears to be the current
practice in the major antitrust jurisdictions. As Lyons (2002, p. 1) highlights, most major competition authorities
operate under legislation and guidelines that reject this [total surplus] standard, and no major competition authority
seems to apply it consistently.
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suggests that they should scrutinize these pricing strategies with greater zeal in markets that could
be reasonably well represented by the two-dimensional distribution assumption.
5 Extensions
In this section we discuss the main implications in terms of the prot and consumer welfare
e¤ects of BBPD12 when the base model is extended to (i) asymmetric dimensions and (ii) myopic
consumers.
5.1 Asymmetric dimensions (t1 6= t2)
The previous analysis focused attention on a symmetric two-dimensional model where t1 = t2 =
t: So, it is natural to wonder what would be the implications for the proposed game if one allows for
two asymmetric dimensions. Without loss of generality, assume that t1  t2. We only look for the
symmetric equilibrium. Taking into account this possibility we nd that when t1  t2, the slope of
MCL is not necessarily  1, but instead   t1t2 . The MCL line will cross both top and horizontal lines
in period 1. In period 2, if t2 is not too small relative to t1 (i.e., t2t1  23), then MCL will cross the
left (right) vertical line in market 1 (market 2). However, if t2t1 <
2
3 , then the MCL line will cross
both horizontal lines in both markets in period 2.
Remember that in our base model with t2t1 = 1; we found that BBPD benets rms at the
expense of consumers. After solving the model for t1  t2;13 it can be shown that the sign of the
e¤ect of BBPD on prots and consumer welfare prevails as long as t2t1 2 (1; 1] with 1  0:9221.
However, the results become qualitatively di¤erent when t2t1 goes down further. In particular, when
t2
t1
2 (2; 1) with 2  0:8695, BBPD hurts both rms and consumers. When t2t1 2 (23 ; 2), BBPD
benets consumers at the expense of rms. When t2 is su¢ ciently small ( t2t1 <
2
3), dimension 2 is
strongly dominated by dimension 114 and our two-dimensional results are qualitatively the same as
those obtained in one-dimensional models, thus BBPD is good for consumers but bad for rms.15
12Remember that because consumers buy e¢ ciently under uniform pricing, the permission of BBPD will always
have a negative impact on social welfare.
13Proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request.
14Following Irmen and Thisse (1998) we can say that in our two-period model, dimension 1 is strong dominant
when t1 > 32 t2.
15 In both cases of t2
t1
2 [ 2
3
; 0:8695) and t2
t1
< 2
3
, BBPD benets consumers at the cost rms. However, prots
depend on t2 in the former case but not the latter case (due to the irrelevance of the second dimension).
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5.2 Myopic consumers
So far we have assumed that consumers are forward-looking in the sense that they anticipate
that next period prices may depend on their behavior in period 1. Relaxing this assumption in
our framework would imply assuming that in period 1 consumers are myopic, which means that
they do not anticipate any poaching attempt by rms in the future. The second period equilibrium
is obviously the same as in the base model. However, in period 1, each consumer makes his/her
purchasing decision solely based on the rst-period utility of buying from either rm. The marginal
indi¤erent consumer is characterized by
V   p1A   tx2   ty2 = V   p1B   t(1  x)2   t(1  y)2:
With myopic consumers, we can directly solve for the marginal consumer located at (x1; 0);
which yields
x1 = 1  p1A   p1B
2t
:
Solving both rmsrst period FOCs, it is straightforward to obtain the equilibrium prices
and prots.16 In the two-dimensional model with myopic consumers, we nd that the practice
of BBPD softens price competition in the rst-period, and so rst-period prices are above their
non-discrimination counterparts. This is in contrast to the result obtained under a one-dimensional
model (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) where BBPD has no impact on rst period price when con-
sumers are naive. The extension of the base model to myopic consumers shows that forward looking
rms do in fact distort their rst period price behavior even when consumers are myopic. Therefore,
it shows that the practice of BBPD in a two-dimensional setting leads rms to raise rst-period
prices above the uniform level whether consumers are forward looking or not.
As explained, in general when rms can engage in price discrimination based on purchase
history there are two e¤ects on rst-period prices: a consumer-side e¤ect and a rm-side e¤ect.
When consumers are forward-looking they correctly anticipate lower second period prices, become
less price sensitive in period 1 and so there is a positive e¤ect on rst-period prices. When rms
are forward looking, they also take into account that changes in the rst-period price change the
rst-period cuto¤ and thus changes the nature of the second-period competition. However, in the
one dimensional model of BBPD a change in the rst-period price has no e¤ect on second-period
prot because with a uniform distribution a rms marginal gains in one second-period market
are exactly o¤set by losses in the other (@2@p1 = 0): Thus, in this case the decrease in the price
sensitivity of consumers in period 1 that occurs when we move from no discrimination to BBPD
fully determines the result of rst-period prices above the non-discrimination level.
In the two-dimensional model with a uniform distribution we nd that a change in the rst-
period price does not cancel out in the neighborhood of x1 = 1, specically we nd that
@2A
@p1A
> 0,
16Proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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suggesting that rm As marginal gains in one second-period market (higher price p2A2 targeted
to market 2) are higher than losses in the other (lower price p2A1 targeted market 1). Thus, rms
price above the uniform rst-period prices even when consumers are myopic. However as expected
rms set higher rst-period prices under BBPD with forward-looking consumers.
Regarding the rmsprots with myopic consumers, we nd that period 2 prots are higher
than their counterparts in a one-dimensional model but below the non-discrimination prot:
2 dimensionu > 
2 dimension
2i > 
1 dimension
2i ; i = A;B:
Further, the rst-period prot with BBPD satises:
2 dimension1i > 
1 dimension
1i = 
2 dimension
1u ; i = A;B:
It is important to stress that in contrast to what happens under forward looking consumers,
the assumption of consumersnaivety is bad for overall prots. Indeed, we nd that under myopic
consumers, although BBPD raises rst-period prots, the overall impact on prots is negative.
The reason is that the increase in prots in period 1 (due to higher rst-period prices even when
consumers are naive) is not enough to overcome the decrease in prots in period 2 (due to price
discrimination). The economic intuition is the following. The consideration of second period utility
in rst period purchasing decisions makes consumers less sensitive to price cuts in period 1, allowing
rms to further raise prices. This softens price competition in period 1 and raises prices and prots
to a level that overcomes the prot loss in period 2. Consequently, when consumers are naive the
increase in prots in period 1 is not su¢ ciently high to overcome the decrease in prots in period 2,
suggesting that BBPD is bad for overall industry prots in a two-dimensional model with myopic
consumers.
In sum, it is important to stress that the assumption of forward looking versus naive consumers
plays a role on the prot e¤ects of BBPD in a two-dimensional symmetric model. When consumers
are forward looking the model highlights that BBPD boosts industry prots at the expense of
consumer welfare; the reverse happens when consumers are naive.
6 Conclusion
The economics literature on oligopoly price discrimination by purchase history has focused
uniquely on markets with one-dimensional consumer preferences. When these preferences are xed
across time, dynamic price discrimination by competing rms often results in intensied competi-
tion; and such pricing practices typically reduce prots and do not raise consumer welfare concerns.
This article has taken a rst step in developing a theory of BBPD in a two-dimensional consumer
preferences model. In this new framework, the paper addresses the following questions. How does
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price discrimination by purchase history a¤ect competition and consumers? Should public policies
facilitate or prevent the practice of such price discrimination?
In so doing the paper provides useful implications for managers, employing price discrimination
strategies; and for policy competition agencies, evaluating the e¤ects of price discrimination based
on consumerspurchase history. A standard dilemma for managers engaging in price discrimination
based on purchase history, in competitive markets where consumer-preferences are one-dimensional
and xed across time, is that prots fall at the expense of consumer welfare gains. Our analysis
reveals that managers might not necessarily face this dilemma when consumer preferences are
bi-dimensional. Indeed, the paper highlights that behavior-based price discrimination can be a
protable pricing strategy in markets where consumers are sophisticated and their preferences
reasonably well represented by a two symmetric dimensional distribution. For competition policy
agencies the paper highlights that conclusions regarding the prot and consumer welfare e¤ects
of price discrimination based purchase history do depend on the way consumer preferences are
modelled and on what is learned about consumer demand. While BBPD can potentially not raise
consumer welfare concerns in one-dimensional models with xed preferences across time, the reverse
might happen when consumer preferences are rather two-dimensional.
In light of the above, this paper has tried to contribute to the ongoing debate on the economic
implications of price discrimination based on consumerspast behavior, only made possible in the
context of digital markets. The main results of the paper and those in the received literature
suggest that the specicity of each market plays an important role in the conclusions derived.
Notwithstanding the model addressed in this paper is far from covering all complex aspects of
real markets (some of which perhaps not yet known), it provides a theoretical rationale for the
increasingly use of new forms of price discrimination strategies only possible in the context of
digital markets. As the theoretical model provides empirically testable hypotheses, we hope it can
be used for further empirical research.
Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 2
In period 1 MCL crosses the bottom horizontal line at (x1; 0). This gives the following rst
period demand:
q1A =
1
2
x21; q1B = 1  q1A:
Next, we consider period 2. MCL crosses bottom horizontal line at (x2; 0) in market 1 and
crosses top horizontal line at (x3; 1) in market 2. Using the marginal consumer expression, we can
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obtain
x2 = 1 +
p2B1   p2A1
2t
; x3 =
p2B2   p2A2
2t
:
Firmsdemand functions are
q2A1 =
1
2
x22; q2B1 = q1A   q2A1;
q2B2 =
1
2
(1  x3)2; q2A2 = q1B   q2B2:
Firm i = A;Bs problem in market j = 1; 2 is,
max
p2ij
2ij = p2ij  q2ij :
Solving the FOCs, we can obtain
p2A1 =
t
4
q
4x21 + 1 + 1

; p2B1 =
t
4

3
q
4x21 + 1  5

;
p2A2 =
t
4

3
q
9  4x21   5

; p2B2 =
t
4
q
9  4x21 + 1

:
We need to impose that p2B1 = t4

3
p
4x21 + 1  5

 0 and p2A2 = t4

3
p
9  4x21   5

 0:
From p2B1  0 we obtain that x1  23 : The condition p2A2  0 is satised as long as 0 < x1 < 13
p
14;
which is always true. All the other prices are positive. Therefore, when 23  x1  1 :
p2A1 =
t
4
q
4x21 + 1 + 1

; p2B1 =
t
4

3
q
4x21 + 1  5

;
p2A2 =
t
4

3
q
9  4x21   5

; p2B2 =
t
4
q
9  4x21 + 1

:
This proves (ii). To prove (i) note that if x1 < 23 ; then for rm B quoting p2B1 < 0 is always strictly
dominated by p2B1 = 0: Thus, when x1  23 then p2B1 = 0: In this case the best rm A can do is to
charge p2A1 satisfying V  p2A1  tx21 = V  0  t(1 x1)2  t(1 0)2: This yields p2A1 = 2t (1  x1) :
When 23  x1  1; substituting the prices into the rmsprot functions and then aggregating
the prots over the two markets, we can obtain period 2 prots as,
2A =
t
32

 40 +
q
1 + 4x21 + 24x
2
1 +
q
1 + 4x21x
2
1 + 19
q
9  4x21   9x21
q
9  4x21

;
2B =
t
32

 24x21 + 9
q
1 + 4x21x
2
1 + 8 +
q
1 + 4x21 + 3
q
9  4x21   x21
q
9  4x21

:
When x1 < 23 , substituting the prices into the rmsprot functions, we obtain period 2 prots
as
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2A =
t
32

53x21   32x31   41 + 19
q
9  4x21   9x21
q
9  4x21

;
2B =
t
128

1 +
q
9  4x21
3
:
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider a marginal consumer in period 1. If she purchases from A, she will be poached by
rm B in period 2, and enjoy an overall utility of
uA = u1A +   u2B =

V   p1A   tx2   ty2

+ 

V   p2B1   t(1  x)2   t(1  y)2

:
In contrast, if she purchases from rm B in period 1, she will be poached by rm A in period
2 and enjoy an overall utility of
uB = u1B +   u2A =

V   p1B   t(1  x)2   t(1  y)2

+ 

V   p2A2   tx2   ty2

:
MCL is characterized by uA = uB. We consider the specic marginal consumer (x1; 0) where
MCL crosses the bottom horizontal line. Substituting (x; y) = (x1; 0), we can obtain
uA = uB ) (p1B   p1A) + 2t(1  x1)(1  ) + 3t
4
q
9  4x21  
q
4x21 + 1

= 0: (8)
Closed form solution for x1 cannot be obtained. Instead, we use implicit function theorem, we
can obtain
dx1
dp1A
=   dx1
dp1B
=  
"
2t(1  ) + 3tx1
 
1p
4x21 + 1
+
1p
9  4x21
!# 1
:
Firm i = A;Bs rst period prot is,
1i = p1i  q1i;
and their overall discounted prot is
i = 1i + 2i; i = A;B:
A change in p1A a¤ects A through 3 channels: (i) directly through p1A on 1A; (ii) indirectly
through x1 on 1A; (iii) indirectly through x1 on 2A (needs discounting). Similarly for rm B.
FOCs are given by
@A
@p1A
=
@1A
@p1A
+
@1A
@x1
 dx1
dp1A
+ 
@2A
@x1
 dx1
dp1A
= 0;
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@B
@p1B
=
@1B
@p1B
+
@1B
@x1
 dx1
dp1B
+ 
@2B
@x1
 dx1
dp1B
= 0:
Next, we solve @B@p1B = 0 to obtain p1B. The expression is too lengthy to report, but it contains
x1 which depends on p1B. We also use equation 8 to solve for p1A. After normalizing t = 1,
@A
@p1A
is a function of  and x1 only. We then plot the value of
@A
@p1A
for  2 [0; 1] and x1 2 [0; 1]. We nd
that @A@p1A = 0 if x1 = 1, and
@A
@p1A
< 0 if x1 < 1.
At x1 = 1, we have p1A = p1B so there exists no asymmetric equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 1
In Lemma 3, we have shown that there is no asymmetric equilibrium. In particular, both rms
FOCs are satised only when x1 = 1 in which case we have
p1A = p1B =
13
p
5  25
10
t+ t
We then substitute them to obtain the second period prices
p2A1 = p2B2 =
p
5 + 1
4
t; p2A2 = p2B1 =
3
p
5  5
4
t;
and prots
2A = 2B =
3
p
5  4
8
t:
Firm i = A;Bs overall discounted prot is
i = 1i + 2i =
41
p
5  70
40
t+
t
2
:
This is the only equilibrium candidate. Next, we verify that no rm has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally. For either rm, there are only two deviations: reduces or raises rst-period price.
We rst rule out rms incentive to raise rst period price. Fix p1B and assume that rm A
increases p1A. This leads to x1 < 1 so our assumed demand structure still holds. In Proof of
Lemma 3, we have shown that @A@p1A < 0 if x1 < 1. Therefore, rm A has no incentive to raise p1A.
Next, we rule out incentives to reduce rst period price. Fix p1A and assume that rm B lowers
p1B. This leads to x1 < 1 so our assumed demand structure still holds. Following similar analysis
as above, we nd that @B@p1B > 0 if x1 < 1. Therefore, rm B has no incentive to lower p1B.
Combined, neither rm has an incentive to raise or lower rst period prices. Therefore, the rst
period prices we calculated, together with the corresponding second period prices, form the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Using the price expressions, we can also obtain the equilibrium
prots in period 2 and overall prots. 
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